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Soviet Viewpoint on Future Developments Communism in Europe and Germany

DIST. 6 August 1947

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ORIGIN

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Strong differences of opinion exist between top Soviet military and political personnel on Russian relations with the western powers, particularly on questions concerning Germany. The military group believes that for economic reasons Russia will not be able to meet any aggression, or to wage an offensive war, until the end of 1948 at least. Moreover, since the majority of the generals believe that

> European countries as yet outside her control, can be realized through the local Communist parties within such countries, these generals conclude that there is no reason for Russia to wage an offensive war. However, this group shares with the party politicians the fear that the United States will attack Russia prior to her complete economic reconstruction and holds, therefore, that all other considerations are secondary to a concentrated effort towards this reconstruction, particularly in the armament industry.

Russia's political objectives, the extension of her influence over

The political point of view on the other hand is that it would be better to anticipate the ultimate attack by America and to make Europe Communist by a bold act of force. It was argued that even Soviet military circles, as well as political circles, were convinced that America had lost "the battle for murope" itself in 1945 when its forces were voluntarily withdrawn westwards to the present zonal boundaries, and that consequently the United States would not seriously attempt to defend western Europe against Russian advances.

The reasons for concluding that the United States will ultimately become the aggressor are, briefly, that a normal transition to peacetime economy would result in the collapse of America's unnatural wartime economic boom; this would result in a depression with fatal social consequences to the United States. The government is, therefore, persuading the American people to continue their war-time expenditures by means of incessant propaganda regarding the threat of Communism and Russian aggression. This government-sponsored boom will inevitably lead to a crisis which can only be resolved by war. The tempo of events leading to this crisis termine the timing of the future overt aggression.

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Consurrent with these developments will be the emergence of an imperialist policy in order to be prepared for war. This will be unavoidable since America must gain markets for her industries. These considerations make the Truman Policy in Greece and Turkey understandable, and account for the supposition existing in some Russian circles that a similar policy will be applied to Finland.

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The expression "imperialist policy" is employed as more accurately reflecting in English the intent of the original German "faschistische Politik".

4. It is a foregone conclusion that the November Foreign Ministers' Conference in London will be a failure. One consequence will be the Russian argument that the Allied Control Council, having been proven unworkable, should be dissolved. The Russians will also ask the military missions of the western allies to leave Berlin; if necessary, they will force such a departure step by step. Within two years after the Conference, the western allies will have vacated Berlin completely.

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: These statements were made with great emphasis and with the general agreement of the Russian officers present.

5. After the London Conference the independence of the eastern states will be considered.

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- Under no circumstances will Russia reduce her \$10,000,000,000 reparations demands which, if necessary, will be taken in toto from the eastern zone regardless of consequences.
- 7. The following developments are foreseen by the Russians after the anticipated failure of the London Conference:
 - a. The "Iron Curtain" will become tighter.
 - b. Western German; will not be able to feed itself alone; even England and America will be unable to provide the necessary foodstuffs in the long run, particularly if America herself is preparing for war. Food and economic conditions will, therefore, lead to such increased difficulties in the administration of the western zones that ultimately all Germans will realize that the failure to unify (ermany had been irresponsible. With that realization, it will be merely a matter of clever propaganda to convince the German people that the western powers had been the ones who at the Moscow Conference had prevented Germany's unification.
 - c. This all-out propagenda campaign will be started, however, only when, in anticipation of an armed conflict, it will become necessary to win the neutral Germans to the Russian cause.



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- d. In order to prepare the western zones for these developments there exists a "clear-cut program" which, excluding the western KPD as inconsequential, has two main objectives:
 - (1) Increasing the strength of the workers' councils, 76% of whose leaders are solid Communists or SED men according to Russian statistics, and of the trade unions in order to create an effective resistance by the labor masses against the western occupation forces; and
 - (2) Persuading German administrative personnel in the western zones to avoid collaboration in any form so that ultimately the western powers alone will bear all responsibility for conditions in their respective zones.

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